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Abstract
There has apparently been a significant paradigm shift regarding community
bank risk management, at least from the viewpoint of recent legislation. As it
is titled, the new act is to promote economic growth, provide tailored regulatory relief and enhance customer protection. One wonders whether the
soundness of the U.S. system of smaller banks will be compromised. The
purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of the new policy changes effective 2014 on the asset and liability portfolios of community banks.
We begin our research program by examining community banks in South
Dakota. The results of stochastic cost frontier model on South Dakota community banks show that South Dakota community banks improve operation
efficiency after receiving relief on capital constraint.

Methodology
Liu and Cortets (2015), Coccorese (2014), Berger and Mester
(1997), and Mester (1996) employ variations of Stochastic
Frontier analysis to analyze the operating efficiency of financial
institutions. We then propose to follow this stream of research
and adopt the concepts of Stochastic Frontier Analysis
originally developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) to build a Stochastic Cost
Frontier models in estimating the cost efficiency of financial
institutions prior to and after the relief of a capital constraint.
Stochastic Cost Frontier Model
Model 1: ln Ci = f(Xi; B) + Ui +Vi, i=1……...N,

Background
Since the Financial Reform Act of 2010 was enacted, U.S. community banks
have been concerned about the cost of complying with the more restrictive
CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset, Management, Earnings, Liquidity,
Sensitivity) standards and how those costs will impact their ability to
compete with larger U.S. banks. Community banks argue that their mission
is to foster local economic growth and develop a deeper banking relationship
with the local community. Because of the business models under which they
operate, community banks have limited access to external equity funding in
the capital markets. Community banks rely largely on core deposits to make
loans to their customers. As a result, community banks have pleaded with
lawmakers and Federal banking agencies to work on rulemaking to help
address these compliance cost issues.
As directed by the new Policy Statement signed by President Obama, the
Fed formally adopted these revisions on April 9, 2015. The new rules
allowed BHCs and SLHCs with consolidated assets of less than $10 billion
to be exempt from the FRB’s risk-based capital and leverage rules, and
therefore to be exempt from complying with the Basel III banking
regulations.

Literature Review
Dahl, Meyer, and Neely (2016) document the relationship between compliance costs and bank performance using bank survey data. The bank survey
data emphasizes financial institutions with total assets less than $10 billion.
Compliance expenses were collected from these smaller financial
institutions. This research indicates that a higher compliance cost is not
necessarily associated with higher performance in terms of CAMELS
ratings. This result therefore supports recent policy proposals to reduce
burdensome regulations on smaller banks.
Chang and Talley (2017) examines US bank risk taking behavior by
analyzing changes on on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet activities. They
conclude that larger banks are likely to engage in riskier on-balance-sheet
and off-balance-sheet investments for higher returns. This research also
supports policy proposals to relieve the regulatory burden on smaller banks.
Deyoung, Distinguin, and Tarazi (2018) analyzes the liquidity behavior of
commercial banks of different sizes in response to negative capital shocks.
They use data from pre-Basel III period, when regulation constrained bank
equity capital decisions but did not similarly constrain liquidity positions.
Their finding shows that smaller-sized banks treat liquidity and capital as
substitutes. As a result, this study also provides additional support for the
policy proposals to exempt community banks from the stricter liquidity
ratios imposed by Basel III.

Wherein C is observed cost of banks, X is a vector of bankspecific variables including banks on-balance-sheet assets, offbalance-sheet assets, capital ratio, leverage ratio and other
controlled variables, B is a vector of parameters. f(X,B) is
predicted log cost given a vector of X . U is one side-error term
representing cost inefficiency, which is calculated by the
difference between the predicted cost value from its frontier.
V is a two-sided error term representing statistical ‘white noise’
that is independent of U. N is the number of community banks
in the sample. The variable U is of particular interest as it
measures the degree of bank inefficiency captured by the model.

Results and Discussion
The results of the stochastic cost
frontier model are presented in
Table 1. This study researches all
the community banks in South
Dakota. The average size of
community banks in South Dakota
is 7 million dollars in terms of total
assets. The average number of
community banks in South Dakota
during the period of empirical study
is 77. We collect 2,525 quarterly
data points from 2010 quarter 1 through 2018 quarter 3 from the
Federal government FIEC database. Table 1 shows that community
banks in South Dakota experience production inefficiency prior to and
after the capital constraint relief, indicating banks have operated
below its optimal cost efficiency level. A striking, yet not too
surprising result is that banks in South Dakota improve production
efficiency after the relief from the capital constraint as the inefficiency
measure (mu) decreases to 0.244 from 0.440.
Table 1 : Bank Production Efficiency prior to and after the relief of capital
constraint for community banks

time period prior time period after the
to the relief of
relief of capital
capital constraint constraint

Dependent variable: Efficency ratio
Independent variables :
constant
Agricullture Loan
Commercial and Industrial Loan
Loan secured by Real Estate
Consumer Loan
Allowance for loan and lease losses
Core deposit
Leverage coverage ratio
total capital ratio
ineffciency measures (mu)
/lnsigma2
/ilgtgamma
sigma2
gamma
sigma_u2
sigma_v2

0.021
-0.176
-0.238
-0.222
-0.415
3.599***
0.321**
0.520
0.189
0.440***
-3.659***
2.207***
0.026
0.901
0.023
0.003

-0.110
0.279***
0.345***
0.262***
0.266***
-2.103***
0.286***
-0.651**
0.464***
0.243***
-4.068***
1.461***
0.017
0.812
0.014
0.003

Conclusions
Our findings shed light on banking policy and allow the regulators to
evaluate the impact of the new policy on community banks. It is
evident that smaller community banks need to operate more flexibly
to maximize operational efficiency. According to our estimates, South
Dakota community banks could save as much as $200 million each
quarter. Bank regulators should take this into account and create a fair
environment for both small and large sized banks.

